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INTRODUCTION
Classic Organizational Accidents
ValuJet Flight 592, referred to by its informal call
sign, “Critter” never made it back to the Miami
airport. It crashed into the Florida Everglades,




The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
found that a fire in the cargo hold of the aircraft,
started when several uncapped chemical oxygen
generators ignited then burned into flight control
equipment and caused the pilot to lose control of the
aircraft. The chain of errors leading to the ValuJet
Airlines crash in May 1996 is one of several
examples of an Organizational Accident or an
accident that is deeply rooted in a company’s lack
of leadership commitment and support for safety.
NTSB investigators concluded that the airline, its
maintenance contractor and the federal regulators
all bore some responsibility for the crash. The
maintenance contractor was faulted for improper
safety procedures. The airline was held responsible
for a lack of management oversight. The airline
argued that they were not responsible for this
accident because it was a mistake made by the
maintenance contractor personnel. But, the NTSB
told the ValuJet executives plainly, “You may
contract the maintenance work, but certainly not the
safety responsibility [1].”
Palm-90 Air Florida Crash
Perhaps the first major airline accident attributed to
organizational factors was the Air Florida, Palm-90
crash into the 14th St. Bridge in Washington, D.C.
that occurred on January 13, 1982.
The accident occurred following a severe winter
snow and ice storm. The airport was closed for
most of the day due to the severe weather, but was
re-opened just prior to the accident. The aircraft had
not been deiced for over two hours, yet the flight
crew prepared for immediate flight and began their
ValuJet Crash
Pilot: “What was that?”
Co-pilot: I don’t know”
Pilot: “We got some electrical problem.”
Co-pilot “Yeah. That battery charger’s
kicking in...
Pilot: “We’re losing everything. We need
to go back to Miami.” [1]
2take off sequence without further deicing – leaving
a layer of snow and ice on the wings of the aircraft.
Perhaps unknown to the flight crew, this aircraft
(a Boeing 737), had several published air safety
bulletins warning pilots about difficulties on take
off with snow and ice contaminated wings. Under
these conditions the 737 had a notable tendency to
pitch up abruptly and stall because the aircraft could
not achieve sufficient lift during take-off with dirty
wing surfaces.
Palm-90 crashed into the Potomac,
Washington DC, January 13, 1981
Co-pilot: God, look at that thing! Those don’t seem
right, does it? Uh, that’s not right. (The copilot is
referring to the excessively high cockpit instrument readings
resulting from the flight crew’s failure to properly set a
critical control switch during the preflight set up.)
Pilot: Yes it is. There’s eighty (knots).
Co-pilot: Nah, I don’t think that is right. … Ah,
maybe it is.
Pilot: Hundred-twenty
Co-pilot: I don’t know.
Pilot: vee-1, easy, vee-2 -- Forward, forward, easy.
We only want five hundred. Come forward, just
barely climb (The airplane is now pitching up
violently due to loss of lift).
Co-pilot: Stalling, we’re falling!
Larry, we’re going down, Larry....
Pilot: I know it! [2]
With ice on the wings, the aircraft could not
establish sufficient take of power.
Another key finding of the accident investigation
was that the flight crew forgot to set an engine
sensor switch to the “heat on”, position -- a required
step to be completed prior to take off, given the
prevailing cold weather. Setting this switch to the
“on” position was essential to prevent sensors on
the engine from freezing over due to the excessively
cold weather. As a result of this particular aircrew
mistake, cockpit instruments gave erroneously high
readings. The investigators believed that the pilot
reduced power to the engines because he had
misinterpreted the erroneous instrument readings.
The Palm-90 accident was attributed to a poor
decision chain as a consequence a failure of Air
Florida to give the flight crew adequate training,
pilot judgment error, inappropriate procedures, and
a break down in flight crew communication.
Palm-90 was one of several accidents that led
commercial airlines to initiate training in “crew
resource management” in order to instill in
professional pilots a positive attitude and skills
required to improve flight crew communication.
But the underlying causes of this accident were
clearly organizational in nature.
Air Florida, an upstart airline formed after the initial
deregulation of the airlines in the 1980’s, had been
woefully unprepared to handle interstate Jet flight
operations because they lacked the necessary
infrastructure to adequately train their flight crews,
and did not properly supervise flight operations.
If the term safety culture had been in vogue at the
time of the Palm-90 accident it certainly would have
been used to describe the abominable conditions
that lead two experienced pilots to take off with
3snow and ice adhering to their wings, and to have
lacked the necessary knowledge and skill needed to
make proper risk decisions and to follow the correct
procedures for a takeoff in such adverse conditions.
Origins of the term Safety Culture
The term safety culture actually was first applied in
and accident investigation report published by the
International Atomic Energy Agency’s Nuclear
Advisory Group (AEA) -- following the disastrous
meltdown and steam explosion of the Russian
Chernobyl nuclear plant. The AEA concluded that
the plant nuclear reactor itself was poorly designed,
and the people operating the plant were not properly
trained or supervised. Twenty-eight people died
within a few months of the explosion and many
more succumbed to the residual effects of radiation
poisoning or a variety of radiation induced cancers
[3].
Chernobyl
The April 1986 disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant in the Ukraine was the product of a
flawed Soviet reactor design, coupled with serious
mistakes made by the plant operators in the context
of a system where training was minimal. It was a
direct consequence of Cold War isolation and the
resulting lack of any safety culture (World Nuclear
Association: (http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/chernobyl/inf07.htm .
The former chairman of the NTSB, Dr. John
Lauber, was perhaps the first to bring the term
“culture” to the aviation community. He must have
recognized the influence of such organizational
factors as safety culture and the supervisory
responsibility as the root cause of some aviation
accidents when he stated that, “a probable cause of
the in flight structural breakup of the Continental
Express, which occurred over Texas, was the failure
of this airline’s senior management to establish a
corporate culture that encouraged and enforced
adherence to approved maintenance and quality
assurance procedures [4]”.
Finally, the tragic Columbia Space Shuttle accident
brought the term safety culture and the closely
related concept of the high-reliability organization
(HRO) to the attention of safety specialists and to
the general public’s awareness.
As most of us know, the Columbia break up upon
reentry in February 2003 was caused when the heat
shield protecting the spacecraft was damaged during
a launch after being struck by falling foam debris
from the spacecraft’s rocket fuel storage tank.
The Columbia Accident Investigation Board
(CAIB) concluded that NASA’s organizational
culture and structure had as much to do with this
accident as the falling foam. The Board determined
that ideas coming out high-reliability theory would
be extremely useful in describing the culture that
should exist in the human space flight organization.
CAIB discusses differences between the U.S. Navy
and NASA in terms of safety culture and operation




4NASA could substantially benefit by following the
Navy’s example of best practices [5]. So, it seems
that the term safety culture has developed a wide
audience and is now in the vernacular of the safety
professionals, as well the people that work and
manage operations of aviation, nuclear energy,
aerospace, and other high-hazard industries. Safety
culture then might be considered a term that can be
used to depict accidents of the sort in which
leadership has failed to recognize inherent
operational risks, and has not taken appropriate
measures to ensure the safety of key operations.
But the most egregious aspect of the organizational
accident is the failure of management to recognize
the signs of an impending disaster. In the case of
ValuJet, for example, the airline was actually under
scrutiny by the Federal Aviation Agency for suspect
maintenance practices. And the Columbia accident
was believed to be a continuation of the poor risk
culture previously reflected in the 1986 Challenger
accident. In both cases, NASA employees at the
working ranks had warned their supervisors about
the risk of losing a flight crew due to known system
design flaws, falling foam (that damaged the shuttle
heat shield) in the case of the Columbia and the
deterioration of O-ring seals (causing a fuel leak
explosion) in the case of the Challenger.
Safety Culture and Aviation
The use of the term safety culture has become a
popular discussion topic in the aviation community,
in part as a consequence of the widely published
reports on major aviation and aerospace accidents
that address key organizational issues.
In fact the June 2007 AIR SAFETY WORLD
magazine included two previous articles about
safety culture. The first article High culture: The art
of creating and sustaining a beneficial safety
culture in different setting was written by Peter V.
Augur, Jr. He gave a thorough review of the
concept of safety culture and discussed the role that
safety culture plays in aviation organizations [6].
The second article, written by, Linda Werfelman,
and Anne Paylor entitled. Keys to Safety: Safety
Culture compared US and European Air Traffic
Control (ATC). In this article the authors suggest
that the United States and the European ATC
organizations represent two distinct safety cultures.
The author concluded that the Europeans are ahead
of the USA in the promotion of various aspects of a
strong safety culture, such as open (non-punitive)
reporting of hazards and willingness to discuss
operational errors, or close-calls such as near midair
collisions or runway excursions. [7]
Yet, in spite of the professional’s use of the term
safety culture and many popular notions about it,
there is no widely accepted definition of safety
culture. Moreover, there is no common metric for
measuring the strength of a particular safety culture.
Therefore there is no clear method by which an
organization can assess its safety culture or
diagnose its particular strengths and weaknesses.
This lack of methodology results in some frustration
on the part of the executives who must manage
organizations that necessarily operate in hazardous
environments to conduct their business.
An adage often made by executives is that, “if you
can’t measure it—you can’t manage it.”
US Naval Aviation Safety Culture Study
The US Navy responded to the challenge of
measuring and managing safety culture in 1996,
when their Naval Aviation squadrons experienced a
rash of accidents that they attributed to “Human
Factors.” One accident, in particular, captured the
Navy’s attention. A Navy jet, manned by two
experienced naval aviators, crashed on take-off
from an airport in Tennessee, killing the pilot and
his back seat flight observer, as well as several
civilians on the ground. Navy investigators of this
accident pointed to the failure of the pilot’s
operational command to adequately manage a well
known high-risk pilot.
5F-14 Crash in Tennessee
The pilot in the Tennessee crash was previously
involved in another serious aircraft accident, and he
was considered by his peers to be a marginal
performer. Just prior to the accident, he had just
completed a cross-country flight and visit to his
hometown. During his return flight take off, his
parents were on the side of the runway watching
while the pilot attempted a dangerous high-angle
take off to impress his spectators. The pilot flew
into some low clouds and lost visual contact with
the ground below. He became spatially disoriented
(where he could not tell up from down). The pilot
chose the wrong direction and then crashed into a
residential complex.
Following the Tennessee accident, the author served
as a member of a blue-ribbon panel from 1996-2004
formed by the US Navy to study the underlying
causes of Naval Aviation aircraft accidents. The
panel took recognition of the fact that in the
Tennessee accident, and other accidents like it, the
investigators would encounter comments by some
squadron members like, “well, we could all see this
coming – that pilot was clearly a high-risk aviator--
and it was only a matter of time.”
Then upon investigation, accident boards would
find corroborating information about a particular
marginal pilot or some other known circumstances
underlying an accident that produced risks which
were not appropriately managed by the leaders in
the command. Had the organization’s leadership
understood the risk and had they responded and
taken proper measures to reduce the risks, a
particular accident might not have occurred.
This panel conducted a thorough review of Naval
Aviation accident causes and concluded that
accidents of this type were very similar in kind to
civilian accidents like ValuJet, Chernobyl and the
Space Shuttle. This finding led to the development
of the initial survey instrument designed to assess
safety climate and safety culture, and other related
organizational factors of aviation squadrons.
US Naval Aviation Study
The author and his colleagues from the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey California and
University of California at Berkeley set out to
explore innovative methods for assessing such
organizational factors, as safety climate and safety
culture [8, 9]. The rationale behind this effort was
based on the finding that many US Naval Aviation
accidents traced their roots to a lack of leadership
commitment and management oversight – resulting
in a poor command climate, a weak safety culture,
and risky supervisory practices.
The US Naval Postgraduate School faculty worked
in collaboration with Professor K.R. Roberts,
University of California at Berkeley, to construct an
organizational safety effectiveness employee survey
based on Robert’s theory of a High Reliability
Organization or HRO. Roberts and her colleagues
saw a common thread of factors that cut across
organizational accidents like the Columbia,
Chernobyl and ValuJet, and others. In each of these
cases there was a general lack of supervisory
control resulting in the failure of employees to make
appropriate risk decisions, or to follow the correct
procedures required to operate safely [10,11].
Basically, Roberts and her colleagues believe that
some organizations are able to operate more reliably
than others because they place a higher value on
safety and greater focus on avoiding failure.
6Roberts conducted field studies aboard US Naval
Aircraft Carriers, Air Traffic Control facilities, and
US nuclear plants. These kinds of organizations
have learned through their history how to best
manage their risks. Some of the characteristics that
typify high-reliability organizations (HRO’s) are:
 Accurate perception of hazards and
operational risks
 Commitment and involvement of all
management levels in safety
 Open reporting of any unsafe condition or
risk situations
 Good communications up and down the
command chain
 Continuous training, with high performance
standards in place
 A culture of trust between workers and their
supervisors
US Navy Survey based on HRO Theory
Naval Postgraduate School Professors Ciavarelli
and Figlock developed a Safety Climate Survey
based upon key principle drawn from HRO theory
and early work by related to measurement of safety
climate. The initial survey developed was called the
Command Safety Assessment (CSA) Survey [10].
An Internet, Web-based, version of the CSA was
developed and now is in regular use by all US Navy
and Marine Corps aviation units. The online survey
enables respondents to submit voluntary and
anonymous inputs regarding their individual
attitudes and opinions about their organization’s
safety climate based upon criteria or characteristics
attributed to an HRO. The CSA was developed
specifically for Naval Aircrews, and its counterpart
the Maintenance Climate Assessment (MCAS) was
developed later for aircraft maintenance personnel.
Each survey asks Naval Aviation personnel to rate
the command based on their perception of the unit’s
performance as an HRO.
Safety Climate and Culture
Later versions of the CSA incorporated various
aspects of safety culture and safety climate into the
Survey, based on the work of European social
scientists. These researchers, working primarily in
the Oil and Gas Industry greatly improved our
understanding of the differences between safety
culture and safety climate. They were careful to
distinguish the meaning of the terms safety culture
and safety climate [12, 13].
Culture is considered to be the force behind an
organization’s goals, and it drives the means to
attain goals, and how to achieve success. An
organization’s cultural values also guide the
decisions and actions for correcting deviations from
norms and expectations [14, 15].
Safety culture is defined as the shared values,
beliefs, assumptions, and norms that govern
decision-making and that may affect individual and
group attitudes about danger, safety, and the proper
conduct of hazardous operations.
Safety climate is an important indicator of the
underlying safety culture.
Safety climate refers to the shared perception of the
people in an organization that their leaders are
genuinely committed to safety of operations, and
have taken appropriate measures to communicate
safety principles, and to ensure adherence to safety
standards and procedures [16, 17].
Safety climate is considered to be a “snapshot” of
the prevailing attitudes among organizational
members about management’s commitment to
safety, given the underlying culture. It represents
the perception of people about their organization,
taken under the conditions found in the workplace
at the time that a particular survey was completed.
The CSA/MCAS survey assessments developed for
the Navy, and later applications in civilian aviation,
aerospace and healthcare, are intended to measure
7safety climate and to determine the overall safety
effectiveness at the organizational level. Survey
items are designed to address key aspects of safety
climate, including people’s perceptions regarding
management’s commitment to safety, the efficacy
of risk management processes, attitudes about the
work environment and opinions about safety
program effectiveness. Results from the survey
sometimes can be used in the estimation of accident
risk. The risk of an “organizational accident” is
based on the extent to which the organization
exhibits HRO attributes of leadership commitment
to safety, adequacy of policies, adherence to
standards and other factors [18]. .
The application of the HRO-based safety climate
surveys in selected US Naval and Marine Corps
units has been very well received, and serves as an
important source of performance feedback for
Naval Commanders in understanding the state of
their safety climate, for judging their safety culture,
and for improving the safety of squadron operations
by providing the opportunity to intervene and break
the chain of events that might lead to an accident.
Since its inception in 1997, the CSA alone has been
administered to all US Navy and Marine Corps
squadrons, with over 80,000 survey respondents in
the Navy’s CSA database at this writing.
The success of the Navy’s CSA led to numerous
demands for similar survey approaches in civilian
companies, and eventually led the author to develop
comparable online survey systems that are now
used across the world in civilian aviation, aerospace
operations, and some healthcare industries.
Examples of Safety climate Findings
Over the years survey methods for assessing safety
climate and culture have matured to provide
organizations with reliable and valid measures.
Findings from such surveys have been consistent
and useful. For example, Figure 5 shows the results
of the Navy’s CSA survey item ratings taken from
over 10,000 respondents and shows a comparison
across military ranks. The chart shows that much
higher ratings are given by senior ranking
commissioned officers (04-06- Navy Commander-
Captain) compared to lower officer ranks (01-03-
Lieutenant to Lieutenant Commander). This relationship
also held for the non-commissioned officers. Higher
ranking enlisted officers (E6-E9- Petty Officers) gave
higher ratings than the lower ranks (E1-E5 -Seaman)
The application of similar safety climate surveys
has shown comparable results for the civilian
aviation, aerospace and healthcare industries.
Climate ratings are always consistently higher
among an organization’s supervisors compared to
workers. This finding suggests that many
supervisors might not be well-connected to the
thoughts and feelings of their subordinates when it
comes to the perception of safety climate and the
strength of their culture.
Validating the Measurement Approach
Professional survey developers place a high value
on the worth of surveys in terms of “statistical
goodness.” Two of the important aspects of the
“statistical goodness” of a survey are the survey’s
reliability and validity.
Reliability refers to the dependability of measures
obtained in a particular survey. Basically, when a
survey is reliable this means that the results are
relatively error free and consistent – so that if the
survey were administered twice to the same people
at the same time, the ratings would be identical.
Establishing the reliability of measures is one of
the first steps in determining the usefulness of a
survey. Unless the survey can be shown to be
reliable, by using a variety of statistical methods,
there would be no point in attempting to show that
the survey is valid for its purpose. Reliability is an
essential requirement for establishing the “validity”
of the survey. If the obtained ratings were “jumping
all over the place” i.e. appearing as random and
unreliable, then you simply could not trust the
findings, and could not draw valid conclusions
about any specific results.
8The statistical reliability of both US Navy and
civilian surveys was found to be very high,
reflecting a good amount of response consistency
among survey takers for multiple applications [18].
The term “validity” refers to a different issue about
the survey measures. We want to believe that we are
really measuring what we set out to measure – in
this case safety climate and its close relative safety
culture. To meet this particular validity requirement
the survey instrument itself must be carefully
constructed to reflect the key attributes of climate
and culture.
This kind of validity is called “content validity”,
and focuses on inclusion of survey items that reflect
some of the underlying organizational dimensions
like climate, culture, or HRO attributes.
Here are some examples of survey items, based on
adherence to content validity:
1. My command has a realistic view of or our
operational risks.
2. The leadership in this command is very
committed to safe operations.
3. All levels of management are actively involved in
keeping us safe.
4. I am not reluctant to report an unsafe condition or
a high-risk incident.
5. Deliberate violations of rules or standards are
very rare in my unit.
A well designed survey will not only ask the right
questions, but will prove useful in diagnosing an
organization’s strengths and shortcomings.
Sometimes the goal of diagnostic analysis is
achieved by organizing survey items into specific
measurement areas that reflect different components
of climate, culture or set of HRO attributes. For the
CSA, the categories of the survey were borrowed
from studies by University of California researchers
Karlene Roberts and Carolyn Libuser, and were
adapted for our purpose [19].
Five categories, representing different components
of an HRO are:
1. Safety Process Auditing (SPA) -- a system of checks and
reviews to monitor and improve processes
2. Safety Culture and Reward System (SCRS) -- social
recognition that reinforces desired behavior, or corrects
undesired behavior
3. Quality Assurance (QA) -- policies / procedures that
promote high-quality performance and work performance
4. Risk Management (RSK MNGT) – whether or not the
leaders correctly perceive operational risks and take corrective
action
5. Leadership and Supervision (LDSHP) – policies,
procedures, and communication processes used to improve
people’s skills and to proactively manage work activities and
operational risk
Making good use of survey data
After the survey is administered, the results can be
reviewed as an overall survey outcome (average
rating across all survey items), or the results can be
broken down and compared by each individual
HRO component (safety process auditing, safety
culture-reward system, etc.). Figure 1 shows an
example of the “supervisor’s dashboard display”,
which depicts the survey results by examining
survey item averages, and percent agreement. The
display is segmented, and color coded, so that the
supervisor can see the statistical summary data
divided by the five key components of the safety
climate survey – Safety Process Auditing (SPA),
Quality Assurance (QA), Safety Culture and
Reward System (SCRS), Risk Management (RSK
MNGT), and Leadership and Supervision (LDSHP).
Figure 2 shows the Normal Distribution Curve, or
“Bell curve”, that illustrates how survey ratings can
be viewed against a specific average or central
value in the normal distribution. Using this diagram,
and a little statistical computation, a specific
organization (company or department within a
company) can compare its results to an overall
average or norm.
9The norm can be based on a particular company’s
average rating or on the average for that particular
industry. With this “normative” approach it would
be possible to establish norms for the entire airline
industry or another sector of the aviation industry,
like Air Traffic Control. And, with enough survey
data we would be able to establish norms, or
standards for different industry sectors like
Aerospace, Oil and Gas Extraction, and Healthcare.
Figure 3 – Illustrates how normative information on
a Supervisor’s Display can be presented. The survey
results feedback display shows a typical bar chart
with agreement percentages along the five - point
(1-5) Likert Rating Scale. This display also shows a
bell curve indicating the placement of a specific
organization’s average rating on the bell curve.
This placement allows a particular organization,
like a single company department, to compare its
own organization’s average to an overall company
average or norm. Figure 4 – Percent graphs and
normative display curve for selected survey items.
Final Survey Validation Process
Once we have a reasonable sample of survey data,
we can approach another aspect of “statistical
goodness” – that of “predictive” validity.
We would expect organizations with a good safety
climate and strong culture to have a better safety
record than those organizations that do not. In fact,
this is exactly what we have found out in examining
the safety climate ratings across many surveys taken
over the past few years in Naval Aviation. Figure 5
and Figure 6 show different aspects of the
relationship between safety climate ratings and
safety performance outcomes - measured in terms
of the aircraft accidents occurring in a defined
period between survey administration and accident
occurrences [21, 22]. Figure 6 shows the frequency
of naval aircraft accidents (A, B, and C levels of
accident severity (running from A most serious to C
least serious accident), for each of four equal
intervals (quadrants) along the safety climate scale.
Figure 5 presents some results that show accidents
overlaid on one specific survey component (Risk
Management Scale of the CSA).
As can be seen from both Figures 5 and 6, there are
large differences in accident occurrences along the
safety climate scale. These Figures show
differences that indicate more favorable safety
performance outcomes (less accidents) for those
units scoring higher on safety climate ratings.
In figure 5, for example, the units in the lowest
quartile (interval 2.90-3.59) of the Maintenance
Climate Assessment Survey (MCAS) had nearly
twice the number of accidents (94 vs. 49) in the 24-
month time frame [20].
In figure 6, derived only from the CSA Risk
Management subscale, there is a clear relationship
between the ratings of potential risk exposure,
judged by respondents and the accident frequency –
the lower the rating on the risk management scale,
the more accidents the unit had for the defined
period [21].
Aviation and Medicine Comparison
In another application of high-reliability based
safety climate measurement we compared ratings
obtained on the Navy’s CSA to ratings obtained on
a similar survey given to a sample of hospitals [22].
Figure 7 shows an example of the results obtained
when 23 common Likert scale survey items used by
the Navy and in the hospital study were compared
in terms of the number of defined “problematic
responses”, i.e. survey responses that should have
been answered favorably, but were not, indicating a
fair-to-poor safety climate. The overall problematic
response rate was about 6% for naval aviation
verses 18% for hospitals [22, 23]
Authors of the US Navy-Hospital study concluded
that the perception of naval personnel was far more
positive because the US Navy has had a longer
history of focusing on potential failures and has
formulated specific processes over the past 60 years
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or so to ensure that their command leadership is
active in the prevention of accidents.
Conclusions and Implications
Accidents across a variety of industries, including
aviation, aerospace, and healthcare appear to exhibit
the same or similar factors underlying what has
become know as an “organizational accident.”
The US Navy and several high-hazard civilian
industries in aviation, aerospace and healthcare now
recognize the influence of such organizational
factors as safety climate and culture on the their
safety performance. The leaders of these
organizations have sought a means to determine the
state of their safety climate and culture, as
perceived by their employees – because it is
understood that the people “on the ground” are
closest to the daily routines and risk issues that may
prevail in any high-hazard business operation.
Safety Climate-Culture Surveys are one means for
managers to keep abreast of hazards and risks
inherent in their organization. Survey results can
provide the opportunity for an organization to
identify possible unknown risks and to intervene in
time to prevent accidents and man-made disasters.
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Figure 2 - Norming Survey Data
Figure 1 - Sample Results Feedback
Display
Rating is 1 standard
unit below mean (X) or
at the 14th percentile
(left side - dark blue).
86% of scores (right
side - light blue) are
above this value.
Supervisors can use this “dashboard” to review survey results displayed as percent favorable
responses (left side of chart), average ratings (right side of chart). The survey items are on the
bottom of the chart and bars are color-coded to show different sections of the survey.
(V. Coletta, Dashboard Design)
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Figure 3 shows the overall results of a specific organization in terms of the percentage of unfavorable to
favorable responses (left side chart). The right side of this display shows the bell curve with the placement of an
Figure 3 - Supervisor Feedback Display Showing Results Compared to a NormS pervisors can view a normal Bell curve diagram that shows how pers nnel rate
their specific organization in comparison to the average for all survey ratings.
14
organization’s “Western Division” with respect to an overall average. In this hypothetical case, this organization
scores in the 45.66 percentile – just below average which would be the 50th percentile.
Figure 4 - Supervisor’s Feedback Display Showing Selected Survey Item Results
The above charts show hypothetical results, in which specific survey items are compared to an overall average.
15
Figure 5: Differences in safety climate ratings among military ranks

















































Figure 6: Safety Climate verses Accidents:
Months





















2.90-3.59 3.59-3.72 3.72-3.82 3.82-4.26













(Gaba, Singer, Sinaiko, Bowen, and Ciavarelli, 2003)






















































Quartiles based on Risk Management Average
Figure 7: CSA Risk Management Scale and Accidents
(Schimpf & Figlock, 2006)
US NAVY SURVEY STUDIES:
Statistical Results
Schimpf & Kinzer 2004
